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Abstract 
 
This paper offers an introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s theory of critical realism, presenting it as a 
distinct meta-theoretical perspective from which research in the social sciences may be conducted. It 
begins by examining how critical realism emerged in reaction to the inadequacies of strong forms of 
the positivist and constructionist traditions, before considering the major conceptual and 
methodological differences between each of these positions. Against this background, critical realism 
is characterised as a ‘maximally inclusive’ meta-theoretical perspective which is able to accommodate 
the strengths of both the positivist and constructionist positions while avoiding their weaknesses.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims to provide an introduction to critical realism for those engaged in social scientific 
research. Conducting research in the social sciences invariably involves making certain philosophical 
assumptions, both about the nature of the object of research and also about the nature of the world 
in which it is situated. Indeed, one might say that the researcher must adopt a particular ‘meta-
theoretical perspective’ from which to proceed (Bhaskar and Danermark 2006). Researchers tend to 
work within the parameters of an intellectual tradition, and in doing so they often inherit a meta-
theoretical perspective which shapes their methodology and the way in which they interpret their 
results.  
 
It might be argued that the discipline of social science provides an exception to this account. After 
all, many of the dominant positions in contemporary social science (which I will characterise broadly 
as ‘constructionist’) have emerged, at least in part, in reaction to the restrictions which strong forms 
of positivism place on the possibility of conducting social scientific research. Thus, social scientists 
might well be thought to be more aware than most of the problems which an inadequate intellectual 
tradition can have for a researcher. However, despite the innovative and reflexive spirit which 
characterises much contemporary social scientific method, I suggest that strong forms of 
constructionism which fail to pay sufficient attention to the ontological nature of the object under 
investigation and the world in which it is situated will also provide an inadequate position from 
which to conduct research. While there is much to be gained from the criticism that constructionists 
have directed towards positivism, I suggest that strong forms of constructionism also struggle to 
provide a credible ideological foundation upon which to base research in the social sciences, and 
argue that more nuanced forms of realism are preferable. This may include weak forms of 
constructionism which understand that social phenomena are not exhausted by their nature as 
socially constructed concepts, as well as sophisticated positivist positions which allow for the 
existence of socially constructed phenomena. However, of all such nuanced realist positions which 
tread the middle ground between strong forms of positivism and constructivism, I argue that Roy 
Bhaskar’s critical realism provides the strongest meta-theoretical perspective from which to conduct 
research in both the natural and social sciences. 
 
My aim for this paper is not to provide an in depth discussion which compares in detail the 
strengths and weaknesses of the positivist, constructionist and critical realist perspectives. Rather, I 
hope to achieve the more limited aim of introducing critical realism by describing how it has 
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emerged in reaction to the inadequacies of the strongest forms of the positivist and constructionist 
traditions. My treatment of these traditions must therefore be partly understood heuristically, and 
indeed I accept that once one moves to the weaker versions of these traditions the labels which 
separate them from critical realism lose much of their significance. However, while it may be 
consistent with weak forms of positivism and constructivism, I believe critical realism presents the 
most sophisticated meta-theoretical perspective from which to conduct social scientific research 
since it is able to capture insights from the positivist and the constructionist traditions and present 
them in a single coherent, “maximally inclusive” position (Bhaskar and Danermark 2006: 280). 
Presenting critical realism in such terms will inevitably introduce a critical dimension to my analysis, 
though a full defence of critical realism must be left for another occasion. I will begin by considering 
the positivist and constructionist positions, before moving on to present critical realism.  
 
 
2. Positivism 
 
Put simply, I shall describe ‘positivism’ in broad terms as a realist meta-theoretical position which 
understands the world to be a concrete, mind independent entity, existing ‘out there’ to be 
discovered by researchers through a process of observation. The emergence of positivism is often 
attributed to Auguste Comte who, in the nineteenth century, aimed to provide a systematic approach 
to developing a positive body of knowledge of the world, in contrast to the more speculative 
assertions provided by theology or metaphysics. Positivism developed through the influence of 
Humean empirical realism which took the world to be “constituted by the objects of actual… 
experiences” (Hartwig, 2007: 167), making observation of the world its starting point for knowledge 
claims. In so much as observation appears to routinely generate positive knowledge about the world, 
empiricism seems an extension of common sense attitudes towards research; our claims to 
knowledge of the world can be verified or discredited to the extent that our experience of the world 
supports these claims. The converse of this is that any claim to knowledge which cannot be verified 
through observation cannot be thought of as providing positive knowledge of the world and should 
therefore be discarded. Logical positivism developed this position into its strongest form by claiming 
that any statement which could not be verified through observation not only could not be claimed 
to be true, it must also be declared meaningless. However, since logical positivism is committed to a 
central statement which is itself unverifiable through observation, it thereby renders itself 
meaningless according to its own criteria. As such, logical positivism has become widely discredited, 
but weaker forms of positivism share its suspicion of the unobservable. Today the most notable 
form of positivism is perhaps the ‘law explanation’ model. This approach was developed by the 
work of Carnap (1996), Hempel (1959) and Popper (1959), who saw the role of research in the 
natural and social sciences as seeking to find universal laws of causal explanation for observed 
events. Law explanation positivism seeks to build theoretical models in the form of covering laws 
that will explain the observed phenomena. Again, the sceptical Humean attitude to the unobservable 
is present: since the researcher tends to observe only the constant conjunction of events rather than 
the particular mechanisms which cause them, the actual mechanisms which cause observable events 
are conceptualized as explanatory laws and denied existence in their own right. 
 
 
Bhaskar argues that common to all forms of positivism is a “monovalent” “actualist” ontology 
(Bhaskar, 2008: 64). That is, he characterizes positivism as subscribing to the view that the world is 
composed of a single ontological domain in which all things are observable. Thus, for positivism, 
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observation forms the criteria for existence, and that which cannot be observed cannot be rightly 
said to exist. As such, non-natural objects which cannot be directly observed (including various 
psychological, social and cultural objects) are regarded with suspicion by positivism, if not denied 
existential status altogether. Moreover, as is seen in explanatory law positivism, relations and causal 
structures themselves tend to be considered to be imaginary cognitive constructs rather than 
concrete features of the world itself. For instance, under law explanation positivism gravity is 
conceptualized as a law which explains the way in which objects are attracted to one another rather 
than a substantive part of the world. Alternatively, methodological individualism, which can be 
understood as reliant on a positivistic meta-theoretical position, argues against the existence of 
unobservable social structures, seeing them as mere aggregates of individual behaviour. This 
emphasis on empirical observation leads to a methodological approach which focuses on the 
researcher cataloguing the constant conjunctions of observable events. Quantitative analytic 
techniques allow the researcher to develop an understanding of the patterns in which events are 
observed to occur. This understanding supposedly enables them to provide both explanations about 
the observed phenomena and predictions of their future occurrence, although a firm commitment to 
the observational criteria for existence leads positivism into the difficulties posed by Hume’s 
problem of induction. Based on Hume’s commitment to empiricism, this problem calls into doubt 
the existence of the unobserved causal structures which are responsible for the observed 
phenomena, thus rendering any claims to knowledge which are based on the recurrence of past 
observation problematic.   
 
 
3. Constructionism 
 
Law explanation positivism has been criticised as providing an unsatisfactory approach to both the 
natural and social sciences by those who would replace it with a qualified form of ‘holistic’ 
positivism, and those who reject the central tenants of positivism altogether in favour of an entirely 
different meta-theoretical approach to research. I will examine the latter position first before briefly 
considering the former.  
 
Perhaps the most significant criticism of the positivist tradition has come from those social scientists 
who found that strong forms of positivism provided them with an inadequate perspective from 
which to conduct research into social phenomena. The positivist tendency to discount non-natural 
and unobservable entities as legitimate objects of research bred an opinion that social science could 
be conceived of as a subsection of the natural sciences, where the same covering law theories of 
explanation were appropriate. For instance, positivism supplies the theoretical foundation for 
theories like behaviorism in psychology and rational choice theory in economics which seek to 
describe psychological and social activity according to covering laws of explanation. Moreover, as we 
have seen already, the reductive tendency of methodological individualism encourages social objects 
to be considered unsuitable objects for investigation. 
 
Broadly speaking, what I shall call the ‘constructionist’ meta-theoretical perspective developed out of 
the restrictions which positivism imposes on social scientific research rather than as a result of any 
concern about the ontological assumptions that positivism makes. Although this label lumps 
together a rich variety of constructionist traditions, common to them all is a resistance to the 
reductive methodology of positivistic social scientific research and a belief that social phenomena 
could not be adequately theorized through a process of observation and explanation. At least in part, 
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constructionism emerged out of a desire which many sociologists had for a research perspective 
which would allow them to do justice to the complex nature of social objects.  This argued that 
social objects are not, (or at least not just), passively received through a process of observation, 
rather they are socially constructed through acts of interpretation and meaning ascription. Outhwaite 
(1987) describes how a ‘hermeneutic critique’ of scientific practice was developed in Europe by 
figures like Droysen, Dilthey, Windelband and Rickert and used to form a broadly hermeneutic 
approach to sociology which was later radicalised in the work of Gadamer and others and enriched 
by the linguistic tradition inspired by Wittgenstein and later figures like Winch and Collingwood. 
Winch (1958: 123) argued that the “social relations between men exist only in and through their 
ideas”, implying that social scientists must incorporate into their research an awareness of the 
relevant concepts and rules which are in play. More broadly, constructionism understands the world, 
especially the social world, to be at least partly the product of social cognitive construction. Rather 
than merely observing how the world is, hermeneutics emphasizes that social scientific research 
should concentrate on how the world is constructed by the observer. Since human beings are always 
situated within some socio-cultural and linguistic framework, their tendency to engage in rule 
following behaviour must be seen within the local context in these rules are interpreted and given 
meaning. Thus, contra positivism, the study of the construction of concepts and the interpretation 
of events and ideas became an essential feature of constructionist social scientific methodology. 
Accordingly, qualitative research techniques were introduced which sought to better understand the 
way in which the world is interpreted and the processes by which agents ascribe meaning. The 
introduction of new qualitative techniques in the social sciences thus created a methodological 
division between natural scientific and anti-naturalist social scientific disciplines. Moreover, to some 
extent, this division was also philosophical since the hermeneutic critique of positivism highlighted 
the weakness of perspectives which fail to recognise that knowledge is a social product, mediated by 
a particular set of linguistic, socio-cultural, political judgements and interpretations (see Danermark, 
2002). It describes how observations never take place from a neutral vantage point, rather access to 
external reality always involves a process of interpretation and conceptual construction. The 
strongest forms of constructionism occupy an anti-realist position, arguing that all reality is 
essentially a social construct (Lyotard, 1984). However, weaker forms of constructionism remain 
ambivalent to the debate between realists and anti-realists by ignoring questions of ontology and 
concentrating exclusively on questions of interpretation and meaning, thereby leaving open the 
possibility of a synthesis of constructionist and realist positions. Indeed, the most sophisticated 
forms of social constructionism, such as is provided by Searle (1995), do just this by grounding an 
account of the socially constructed aspects of the world within a wider realist understanding of a 
real, mind independent world of “brute facts”.  
 
Parallel to the development of the hermeneutic critique of law explanation positivism, a 
sophisticated form of “holistic” positivism emerged in the work of figures like Thomas Kuhn 
(1962), W.V.O. Quine (1970), Rom Harre (1970) and Mary Hesse (1966). Holistic positivism 
suggests that scientific theories cannot be tested in isolation from other theories, rather each theory 
must be seen as part of a coherent web of knowledge. Holism thus presents a sociologically 
enlightened approach to the natural sciences which undermines strong forms of law explanation 
positivism by suggesting that scientific method must respect the socially constructed nature of 
knowledge.  
 
A holistic positivism on one hand and a weak form of social constructionism on the other represent 
qualified positions which reach out to one another across the ideological divide. In the next section I 
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present a third meta-theoretical position, critical realism, which goes further than these two positions 
by seeking to accommodate both a transcendental form of realism and a naturalistic form of 
constructionist social theory.  
 
 
4. Critical Realism 
 
Despite the force of its critique against positivism and the introduction of a valuable set of 
qualitative methodological techniques, constructionism is not without problems, motivating a search 
for a further alternative meta-theoretical position. I shall present critical realism in its two 
constituent parts: firstly in its response to positivism through the development of transcendental 
realism, and secondly through its opposition to constructionism detailed in Bhaskar’s account of 
critical naturalism. 
 
Bhaskar’s transcendental realism objects first and foremost to positivism’s conceptualization of 
causal mechanisms. Where positivism may understand terms like “gravity” to refer to an explanatory 
law which describes the causation of observable events, transcendental realism suggests that such 
terms are not merely explanatory constructs generated by human cognition but refer to real and 
concrete structures which operate within the world. Bhaskar (2008) insists that the world is 
composed of objects which possess causal powers by virtue of their internal constitutions. An 
object’s causal powers interact with those of other objects to cause the events which are observed by 
the researcher. Moreover, Bhaskar argues that the world must be composed of concrete causal 
mechanisms in order for natural scientific enquiry to be possible, indeed, the task of natural science 
is simply to describe these causal mechanisms. To my mind this seems to embody a common sense 
scientific view of the world as determined by objects with particular causal powers, but it is a 
position which strong formulations of empirical realism and positivism cannot take up because of 
their commitment to empirical criteria for existence.  
 
The basis for Bhaskar’s assertion is the distinction he draws between epistemology, that which can 
be known (normally though observation), and ontology, that which is. He characterises positivism as 
routinely conflating these two concepts, committing what he dubs the ‘epistemic fallacy’ (Bhaskar, 
2008). By accepting the principles of Humean empiricism, positivism understands the ontological to 
be a domain of the empirical, so that what is is limited by what can be known. Since causal powers 
cannot be directly observed, positivism suggests that they cannot be said to exist and so 
conceptualises them in the form of laws which explain observed regularities. By drawing a 
distinction between epistemology and ontology Bhaskar is able to argue that unobservable entities, 
like causal structures, exist on the basis that they play a causal role in the world, whether their effects 
can be directly observed or not. Bhaskar’s criteria for existence is thus causal rather than 
observational. Indeed, he suggests that it is the nature of objects that determines their cognitive 
possibilities for us, not our cognitive abilities which determines the nature of objects since it is the 
natural constitution of objects that provides them with their particular causal properties. Thus, 
certain kinds of things (or ‘natural kinds’ to use the Lockean terminology) are governed by causal 
laws which make them behave in a specific way. Bhaskar describes this in terms of objects being 
governed by the natural necessity bestowed upon them by their constitutive causal powers. Natural 
necessity thus describes the necessary causal connection which governs the interactions between 
objects, taking us beyond the mere patterns of observed constant conjunctions described by 
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positivism to the deep interactions of each object’s causal structures which determines the nature of 
these observable events.  
 
One consequence of Bhaskar’s argument is that it implies that, as well as containing an observable 
domain (what Bhaskar 2008 calls the ‘empirical’ domain) where events are witnessed, the world must 
also contain a further domain beyond the scope of human experience where the interaction of causal 
structures which cause observable events takes place (the ‘actual’) and a further unobservable domain 
where the underlying potential but unactualised causal structures of objects are located (the ‘real’). 
This schema is described as a ‘depth ontology’, to be contrasted with the flat, monovalent ontology 
of empiricism. 
 
In presenting this account of depth ontology, Bhaskar’s transcendental realism thus provides a 
deeper form of realism than is provided by positivism’s empirical realism. Bhaskar suggests that 
scientific research should switch from concentrating on generating explanatory laws which describe 
observable events to develop a deeper understanding of the mechanisms which cause these events. 
This may seem like a trivial difference, but it is in fact significant: while a law is merely an 
explanatory model, a causal mechanism is a concrete and causally efficacious part of the world! 
Transcendental realism thus involves a move from studying the imaginary (i.e. unreal) laws described 
by positivism to imagined (but potentially real) causal mechanisms (Bhaskar, 2008). While this is 
obviously important for natural scientists, Bhaskar suggests it is also a vital step for social scientists. 
In parallel to natural science, critical realism suggests that social science should focus on developing 
an understanding of the mechanisms which cause social phenomenon with an added concern for 
making recommendations which will bring about the transformation of social outcomes through 
practical action.  
 
Further to this account of depth ontology, Bhaskar describes an object’s causal structures as being 
arranged in ‘emergent’ layers or ‘strata’ (Bhaskar, 2008) which reflect the natural divisions within 
nature. For instance, a human being is composed of various physical, biological, psychological, 
socio-cultural structures which engender it with the ability to cause certain outcomes to occur. As 
Andrew Collier puts it,     
 
“Nature... is a multiplicity of mechanisms jointly producing the course of 
events… these mechanisms are, so to speak, layers of nature, and are ordered, 
not just jumbled up together.” (1994: 46, original emphases). 
 
Structures at the most basic strata provide the basis from which more complex structures at higher 
strata can emerge. For example, all objects are composed of basic physical structures, but some 
more complex organic objects also contain chemical and biological structures which emerge out of 
these physical structures. In turn, these chemical and biological structures may give rise to the 
psychological structures of sentient beings, which in turn may generate socio-cultural structures 
through human activity. Basic structures at the lowest stratas of reality are effectively pre-conditions 
for, and partly explain, the existence of more complex structures at higher strata. It is important to 
note that as one moves up to higher strata, each structure contains a qualitative difference to the 
preceding structures from which it has emerged, providing a resistance to any attempt to describe an 
object in reductive terms. For example, social phenomena must be explained through reference to 
the interaction of social structures, and so cannot be adequately explained in reductive terms of the 
activities of structures at more basic strata (for instance, in the way that rational choice theory or 
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methodological individualism are prone to do).  
 
Though transcendental realism certainly delivers a deeper form of realism than is described by the 
positivist’s meta-theoretical perspective, when it is combined with his critical naturalism (1998) 
Bhaksar’s position presents a far more nuanced, or critical form of realism.  
 
Critical naturalism develops transcendental realism by following, (and contributing to) the 
hermeneutic critique of positivism, recognising that the knowledge claims made about reality have a 
necessarily interpreted character. Thus, critical naturalism further separates critical realism from 
positivism by characterising it as a “naive” form of realism on the grounds that positivism is 
insensitive to the necessarily socially constructed nature of knowledge (Bhaskar and Danermark, 
2006; Sayer, 2000). 
 
In addition to this, critical naturalism further qualifies the position of sophisticated realism by 
admitting that the observer’s access to external reality is problematic. Again, avoiding the 
assumptions of naive realist positions which claim that sensory perception provides a secure 
foundation for knowledge claims, critical realism embraces the fallibility of knowledge claims on the 
basis that although the world is a certain way, our knowledge of it is never complete since much of 
the world lies hidden from our experience. That is, the events that we observe and come to have 
knowledge of are determined by the combined activity of hidden causal structures, located beyond 
the reach of our experience in the domain of the actual and the real. Resisting the epistemic fallacy 
means recognising that the truth about the way the world is lies outside the researcher’s ability to 
observe the world, meaning that knowledge claims are always contingent. Simply put, the world is 
not a product of the models and laws discerned by human agents, rather our concepts and theories 
about the world must fit the way the world is, which may itself be unknowable. Though conceptual 
model building is the hallmark of scientific activity, it is impossible for us to be certain that any of 
these models correctly and definitively capture the way the world actually is in itself. These models 
thus ought rightly to be said to describe tendencies, rather than laws of nature.  
 
In critical realist terms then, knowledge claims are described as the ‘transitive’ products of human 
inquiry into the ‘intransitive’ object of research (Bhaskar, 2008). There are multiple ways in which 
the intransitive world can be interpretive as transitive theories. Natural as well as social scientists 
must develop an awareness of the fallible and transitive status of their research by cultivating a 
reflexive understanding of the essential interpretative nature of knowledge production. Critical 
naturalism thus brings transcendental realism into line with the sociological insights common to 
constructionism and holism to produce a critical realist position. However, critical realism departs 
from both holism and constructionism on ontological grounds, criticising it for naively inheriting the 
flawed ontological assumptions of positivism and in doing so subscribing to the monovalent 
ontology assumed by positivism. As I suggested earlier, constructionism can be seen as a reaction to 
the methodological rather than ontological limitations imposed on social scientific research by 
positivism. The focus of those developing constructionism was to produce a more appropriate 
methodology for conducting social scientific research rather than to challenge the ontological 
deficiencies of positivism. The narrow focus of constructionist social science became the transitive 
domain of knowledge production, and the intransitive reality to which knowledge claims referred to 
tended to be either ignored or dismissed as part of the realist road block which had inhibited social 
science for so long. However, the unwillingness of constructionists to engage with the intransitive 
world does not mean that they will be able to avoid making any ontological commitments. Indeed, 
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those who ignored the ontological questions posed by the development of a new methodology for 
social science may retain a tacit support for some form of realism. Outhwaite (1987) suggests that 
weak constructionism’s inattention to ontology means that they have largely inherited the shallow 
ontology of positivism, but equally, weak constructionism may be compatible with the depth 
ontology described by critical realism as both Sayer (2000) and also Bhaskar and Danermark suggest: 
 
“To weak constructionism, which involves the idea that there is a 
necessarily interpreted element in the construction of any theoretical 
understanding and any social object, a critical realist has no objection. 
However if... [constructionism] is taken to imply that the phenomenon 
investigated is just a theoretical interpretation or cognitive construction, or 
that a social phenomenon such as some specific form of disability exists 
only as an idea or belief, then it is clearly false.” (Bhaskar and Danermark, 
2006: 283-4) 
 
Indeed, sophisticated forms of constructionism such as is presented by Searle (1995) appear happy 
to accept the existence of an intransitive, mind independent world. Yet we should note how by 
dividing the world into natural and institutional domains Searle himself seems to be rejecting a 
monovalent ontology for the sort of depth ontology that is presented by critical realism. 
  
The strongest forms of constructionism are defined by their taking a strict anti-realist stance which 
rejects the existence of any intransitive mind independent reality. Critical realism objects to strong 
constructionism firstly for its extreme anthropocentricity, and secondly on the grounds that it 
commits a version of the epistemic fallacy by collapsing the intransitive object of investigation into 
the transitive domain as a mere epistemic construct. For example, a strong constructionist might 
claim that disability is not a physical impairment but a socially constructed phenomenon caused by 
public attitudes and the socio-cultural circumstances of society. This suggests that there is nothing to 
investigate beyond a social scientific study of socio-cultural attitudes towards physical impairment. 
But clearly what is missing from this picture is the role played by the physical impairment itself! 
Critical realism’s objection to the constructionist’s characterisation of disability argues that although 
disability is a complex phenomenon which is in part caused by socio-cultural attitudes, reducing it to 
just these set of structures ignores the important bio-physical elements which cause the physical 
impairment. Disability research requires a much wider scope, looking at all the structures at a full 
range of emergent strata which have contributed to the cause of the disability, from the bio-physical, 
economic and political structures to those socio-cultural structures responsible for popular attitudes 
towards the disabled. This requires a broadening of the focus of research, to include collaborations 
across and between the natural and social sciences.   
 
Moreover, while critical realism understands how we speak to be important, it retains a belief that 
the object that is spoken about shouldn’t be forgotten, and that researchers should hold a dual focus 
on both of these things. After all, transcendental realism establishes critical realism as a firmly 
naturalistic philosophy interested in the causal structures which govern the world and cause the 
occurrence of events, and critical naturalism seeks to develop naturalism into the social sciences in 
the way that constructionist or hermeneutic positions do not seek to do, or at least do not seek to do 
explicitly. Indeed, Bhaskar’s approach to the social sciences (1998) mimics his approach to natural 
sciences by asking ‘what must the social world be like in order for it to be a possible object for 
knowledge?’. As in the natural sciences the answer is the same for the social sciences: social 
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phenomena are caused by the combined activity of real but hidden causal structures and 
mechanisms. As such, although critical realism recognizes the role that concepts play in generating 
social phenomena, it does not see social objects as being exhausted by these concepts, rather they 
are composed of real generative causal mechanisms out in the world which social scientific 
investigation should be directed at identifying, understanding and in some cases transforming.  
 
While constructionists may already claim to be engaged in seeking to identify the structures which 
explain social phenomena, such as the economic or class structures which underlie observed 
inequalities, there seems to be an important difference in the way constructionists and critical realists 
conceive of these structures. While constructionists may view social structures as cognitive 
constructs, critical realists see them as real and potentially mind-independent parts of the world on 
account of their causal efficaciousness. This is not to say that critical realism falls into the trap of 
reifying social structures by giving them an existence independent from human action. Indeed, 
Bhaskar (1998) suggests that social structures are not enduring in the same way as natural structures 
are, and emerge out of, and are as such dependent upon, human activity. However, Bhaskar points 
out that these social structures exist and will continue to exert a causal influence regardless of 
whether human beings are aware of them or not. Moreover, this enables critical realists to add a 
critical dimension to their analysis of social theories and discourses. For, if social structures are 
accepted to be a real, mind independent part of the world, one becomes able to describe how certain 
theories and practices rely upon their systematic misdescription. Marx’s critique of master-slave wage 
relations might provide a case in point, as would any critique that demonstrates how a discourse 
employs false or disingenuous rhetoric in order to establish and reinforce power.  
 
Though critical realism endorses epistemic relativism on the grounds that knowledge is always 
subject to interpretation, its commitment to ontological realism means that it does not follow that 
any interpretation is as good as another, rather, some descriptions of the world are more truth apt 
than others. This completes the ‘holy trinity’ of critical realism: ontological realism, epistemic 
relativism and judgmental rationality.  
   
Finally, one last methodological consequence of adopting a critical realist approach to social science 
is that the division between the natural and social sciences can be resisted. If, like the natural world, 
the social world is governed by the interaction of real causal structures, the task of the social scientist 
will be to investigate the nature and interaction of these causal structures so that the resulting 
phenomenon may be better understood and either preserved, by retaining the current arrangements 
producing it, or transformed through a change in practice. However, given that research into the 
natural and social sciences takes place in the context of closed and open systems respectively there 
remain important methodological differences between them. Natural science tends to examine 
structures in the context of closed systems (such as a laboratory), so that objects can be isolated and 
mechanisms excluded in ways that social scientific research, which takes place in open systems (for 
example class rooms), cannot. Because the influence of unidentified causal structures in open 
systems cannot be guaranteed against, the social scientist will not be in a position to make 
predictions in the same way as the natural scientist is able to. Rather, critical realism suggests social 
scientists should be in the business of explanation and retroduction, leading to recommendations of 
transformative practice.   
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5. Conclusion  
 
In part, critical realism emerged in reaction to the limitations and inadequacies of strong 
formulations of positivism and constructionism. It takes up a philosophical under-labouring role to 
offer an alternative meta-theoretical position from which to conduct research in the natural and 
social sciences, primarily by reasserting the importance of ontology and its relationship with 
epistemology. By combining the insights of a naturalistic realist and a critical hermeneutic position 
and setting these within the context provided by an emergent depth ontology, critical realism 
presents a “maximally inclusive” meta-theorectical perspective which can “accommodate the 
insights of the other meta-theoretical positions while avoiding their drawbacks” (Bhaskar and 
Danermark 2006: 280). By advocating ontological realism and epistemological relativism, critical 
realism bridges the divide set up by the realist/anti-realist dichotomy, suggesting that research 
practice be sensitive to both observation and interpretation and focuses on developing an 
understanding of the hidden structures and mechanisms which cause both natural and social 
phenomena. 
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